60s were for the most part minimal.
2 Yet by the time Pearson stepped down as prime minister in 1968, "golden age" symbolism and language had come to govern discourse on Canadian external affairs. Partisan messaging thus becomes an apt field for study in assessing what factors contributed to the emergence of a "golden age" narrative during this time. This paper aims to begin to fill this gap in the historiography of Canadian foreign policy by considering how political rhetoric aided the development of "golden age" mythology from its supposed end in the late 1950s up to the beginning of Pearson's second mandate as prime minister. To this end the majority of this paper will be devoted to conducting individual case studies for the 1958, 1962, 1963 and 1965 federal elections in order to analyze how both major parties' rhetoric concerning foreign policy evolved over the course of this period. 3 This analysis will reveal that the Liberals were the most active and vocal supporters of "golden age" mythmaking during these elections and as such the foreign policy messaging of the Liberal Party will be given special attention in these studies.
It was clear from the outset that the 1958 federal election would revolve primarily around domestic policy. With a faltering economy and unemployment rates steadily creeping higher Canadians had little desire to spend time dwelling on issues that lay beyond their borders. Yet more fundamentally, the campaign was a referendum on whether the Liberals deserved to be restored to government after their narrow defeat at the hands of John Diefenbaker's Conservatives in the previous year's election. Even before the writ was dropped this question had come to dominate Canadian political discourse on both sides of the aisle.
Following his defeat in 1957, it soon became clear that Louis St. Laurent's deteriorating health would not allow him to lead the Liberals into the next election. Lester B. Pearson, one of St. Laurent's ablest ministers, was persuaded to seek the leadership at the party's national convention (only the fourth since Confederation) in January of 1958. 4 Pearson's impressive career at the Department of External Affairs had earned him numerous plaudits within the party, allowing him to handily claim the leadership with 77.8% of support on the first ballot. Many of the speeches and resolutions of the 1958 Liberal convention provide useful insight into the party's self-image during the lead-up to the election later that year. On the first day of the convention former citizenship and immigration minister Jack Pickersgill waxed about how at their core the Liberals had always championed a distinct Canadian identity and citizenship that was independent of the British Empire: "By instinct, and often by interest, the Tories stood for the dependency and subjection of the new settlements to the mother country, and they were content to be called subjects; while the political and spiritual ancestors of the Liberals contended, from the earliest times, that free born Englishmen brought their rights with them across the Atlantic. It is that insistence on the rights of free men that is the real germ of Canadian
Pickersgill's convention speech was almost certainly a rebuke of the symbolic shift Canadian foreign policy had taken during the first year of Diefenbaker's premiership. 6 As much of the Conservative base consisted of Canadians who held a strong attachment to Canada's British heritage, Diefenbaker had pursued a foreign policy that sought to strengthen Canadian ties to the Commonwealth. The Liberals in contrast attempted to define Canada's identity as having outgrown its colonial past. As Pickersgill proclaimed later in the same speech this unique independent identity had allowed the country to adopt a "special national character" in international affairs. As evidence he pointed specifically to the Nobel Peace Prize Pearson had won for his involvement in the creation of the United Nations Emergency Force:
Because we have learned to live in peace and, often, even in friendship with our neighbours inside Canada, it seems natural for Canadians to look for peace, and even for friendship, with other nations outside Canada. That is why it seems to me no accident that a great Canadian who happens also to be a great Liberal should have been the winner of the Nobel Peace Prize. Lester Pearson, the man of peace and good will, is in the Canadian tradition. It is our native Canadian tradition of peaceful co-existence slowly mellowing into mutual good will that makes our Canadian citizenship of value not only to ourselves but to the rest of this troubled world.
7
The address by Pickersgill illustrates how the "golden age" Similarly, while the Liberal Party's official 1958 platform mostly focused on domestic issues such as cutting taxes and increasing social security, it did contain several important passages devoted to foreign policy. Incorporating resolutions adopted at the party's convention from earlier in the year, the platform's section on external affairs once again employed the emerging language and symbolism of the "golden age" mythology, being rooted in the premise that "Canada's active role in world affairs as an independently minded middle power is now a Achievement, 1956 -1962 (Scarborough: Signet, 1976 ), 69. 16 Diefenbaker's Statements and Promises, 1958 (Ottawa: National Liberal Federal, 1958) to attack the performance of the Diefenbaker government; to promote the Liberals' "positive programs" for jobs and prosperity; and to improve the public perception of Pearson's leadership by surrounding him with a strong core team of candidates. 25 The Liberal Party consequently focused the majority of its platform on its revitalized domestic agenda. 26 Yet even with this increased attention to domestic issues, the Grits continued to subtly harken back to "golden age" symbolism throughout the 1962 campaign.
As in 1958, the Liberal's foreign policy in the 1962 election was rooted in a commitment to multilateralism, foreign aid and constructive diplomacy. Although in practice such policies had never really been abandoned since the Conservatives had taken office, the thrust of this message was that Canada needed to recommit itself to the "spirit" of traditional (i.e. "golden age") Canadian postwar diplomacy. 27 The section on "Our Place in the World" declared that "Canada's ability to influence world affairs depends on the respect in which we are held. This in turns depends on working steadily and cooperatively with our allies … [and] In spite of occasional back-and-forth rhetoric over Canada's international reputation and the fight against Communism, issues of foreign policy although slightly more important than Canada's nuclear position by stating that "nuclear weapons would be secured in the event circumstances made such a course necessary." 36 Yet in the same speech the prime minister also managed to stimulate even more confusion by declaring that "More and more the nuclear deterrent is becoming of such a nature that more nuclear arms will add nothing material to our defence." 37 Members of the Canadian press interpreted this line as a possible indication that the country was about to withdraw from nuclear commitments. 38 Five days later the American State Department issued a blistering press release that contradicted Diefenbaker's assertion that Canada would acquire nuclear weapons if necessary, stating that "The Canadian Government has not yet proposed any arrangements sufficiently practical to contribute effectively to North American defence."
39
Diefenbaker's equivocation on the nuclear question set the stage for his government's defeat in the House on February 6. Three days earlier he had convened an informal cabinet meeting at his official residence during which George Hees, the minister of trade and commerce, implored the prime minister to once and for all clarify his nuclear stance. This was followed up by a virulent condemnation from the minister of national defence Douglas Harkness, who contended that Diefenbaker had lost the confidence of cabinet. When Diefenbaker asked those ministers who still supported him to stand up, nine remained in their seats. The meeting ended with both Harkness and the prime minister stating that they would resign.
40
Diefenbaker (unsurprisingly) quickly reversed his decision to step down, ignoring other last-minute appeals from several members of his cabinet to resign before the inevitable nonconfidence motion. 41 Harkness delivered his official resignation in the House on February 4, which he asserted was a "matter of principle. 41 Smith, Rogue Tory, 487-488; At a cabinet meeting on February 6, Diefenbaker successfully convinced all but two of his ministers to support the government in the upcoming non-confidence motion. 42 Newman, Renegade in Power, 365. leadership, the breakdown of unity in the cabinet, and confusion and indecision in dealing with national and international problems, does not have the confidence of the Canadian people." Diefenbaker's nebulous policy on nuclear weapons continued throughout the Conservatives' 1963 campaign. In the speech he made just before the government fell, the prime minister had promised "flexibility" regarding the nuclear issue, committing to a final decision by the next NATO council meeting in May and vowing that nuclear warheads could readily be acquired if necessary. 46 Two weeks later, however, Diefenbaker asserted in a campaign speech that Canada's existing NATO arsenal was "useless even when armed with nuclear weapons. … They are only being retained because of the investment." 47 The resignation of cabinet ministers George Hees and Pierre Sévigny shortly after the start of the campaign only compounded the perception that Diefenbaker lacked direction on the nuclear issue, with both ministers accusing the prime minister of abandoning Canada's NATO commitments. 48 The reasons for the prime minister's vacillation on the issue of nuclear weapons (particularly after the Tories attempts in 43 Saywell, Canadian Annual Review for 1963, 9. 44 Ibid., 10; The full amended motion from Thompson read: "This government has failed up to this time to give a clear statement of policy respecting Canada's national defence, and has failed to organize the business of the House so that the 1963-64 estimates and budget could be introduced, and has failed to outline a positive program of followup action respecting many things for which this parliament and previous parliaments have already given authority, and does not have the confidence of the Canadian people." 45 Like Diefenbaker, Pearson had been initially hesitant to come down hard on either side of the nuclear debate. While he had once said that he would "rather be red than dead," by the start of the campaign Pearson had decided that Canada must maintain its existing nuclear commitments while simultaneously opposing "any extension of the number of nations possessing offensive nuclear bombs of independent nuclear forces." 50 On its face the Liberal leader's decision to adopt an explicitly pro-nuclear stance (even a qualified one) is perplexing. Such categorical support for Canadian possession of weapons of mass destruction hardly appears to conform to the Liberals' previous "golden age" rhetoric and commitment to foster a "creative peace" in the face of Soviet aggression. 51 Yet this assessment overlooks other key tenets of the Liberals' ongoing foreign policy, as the Grits had maintained in past elections that Canada must continue to "[work] steadily and cooperatively with our allies" in order to effectively promote global peace . 52 The 1963 Liberal platform uses this very rationale to justify the party's pronuclear policy, in a passage that is worth repeating here in its entirety:
A nuclear war cannot be won. With two great power blocs capable of destroying each other, the only defence is to prevent war starting. Until there is mutual disarmament, with an effective inspection and control, this means that we must have sufficient strength to make sure that no one will attack, because the aggressor knows that he will be destroyed along with his victim. To provide such deterrent strength, we must co-operate closely with our friends in the free world. A country such as Canada cannot defend itself alone. Our defence effort means our contribution to the North Atlantic Alliance. It is collective defence, not defence in isolation. In our policies for external affairs and defence we therefore must get on well with our friends and work closely with them.
53
The Liberals' position on nuclear weapons consequently sought to strike a balance between the pressing realities of the Cold War and the party's proclivity toward a more constructive foreign policy. In weighing Pearson's pro-nuclear stance, historian Robert Bothwell reflected that "Politicians must live in the here and now, and what Canada confronted was an actual problem with its allies and alliances. NATO was a cornerstone of Canada's foreign policy and an asset in its foreign relations." 54 The Liberal platform further maintained that "When Canada is again carrying out her commitments, Canada will again be in a position of influence with her allies." It is tempting to conclude that the nuclear issue was the key factor in 1963 that led to the Liberal's minority victory and the Tories' relegation back to the opposition benches. 56 Yet this would be an overly cursory assessment. At its core the question of nuclear armament was a lens through which the Liberals sought to frame the acute indecisiveness that had characterized the later years of Diefenbaker's premiership. 57 In recounting the non-confidence motion that had I consider government mishandling of the defence issue and the resultant disintegration of their ranks was the main reason for their downfall. But there was more to it than that. … Confidence in the government had not been restored after their narrow escape in the 1962 election -indeed, quite the contrary. No budget had been brought down. There was a growing belief that Diefenbaker was largely to blame for the deterioration of our relations with the United States… 58 The debate over nuclear weapons offered Pearson an opportunity to challenge the more general disposition with which Diefenbaker had approached governance. Indeed, during the latter stages of the campaign signs had begun to emerge that the public's interest in the nuclear issue was waning, with it appearing that Diefenbaker (in spite of the relentless criticism he had endured since the writ dropped) was on track to be reelected. The Grits subsequently shifted the focus of their messaging to the broader issue of domestic leadership, with Pearson promising "sixty days of decision" and a bold legislative agenda should Canadians return the Liberals to power.
59
To the same extent that it had dominated the 1963 campaign, foreign policy in the 1965 election was virtually non-existent. 60 For the most part this was unsurprising. In general, the 1965 campaign (the third in four years) was characterized by weary politicians and apathetic voters. By this point there was little desire amongst the electorate or the political class to even debate domestic issues, much less external ones. Pearson, who had experienced bouts of exhaustion throughout the 1963 election found minority government as a whole to be a frustrating experience. The new prime minister relished the prospect of governing without having to worry about Diefenbaker obstructing his agenda, and predicted that even if the
